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I. INTRODUCTION
The humidity and warmth of the Gulf sun have yet to reach their zenith
in the warm waters off the Yucatan Peninsula. Though miles beyond
the territorial waters of Mexico, the smell and feel of the jungle are
hardly distant. A small but seaworthy vessel, a one time Carolina
shrimper, sometime Peruvian tuna trawler, plods heavily across the dis-
tant horizon. A single helmsman steadies it northeasterly heading
through the uneasy glow of the early morning light. A closer look indi-
cates the boat has cast off its previous piscatorial occupation for a more
lucrative trade. It flies the flag of no land, bears no nets or lines, and is
studded with antennae and light radar. The old black waterline is dis-
tinct some feet beneath the line where the clear water meets the ship as it
cuts its way along the watery highway. The markings are indistinct. The
stern and bow bear a name but no homeport.
Several hundred miles from its South Florida home the United
States Coast Guard cutter increases the revolutions on its twin screws
and sets a course to intercept. With approach imminent, the cutter is
battle ready. The flagless vessel is a drug freighter, heavily laden with
marijuana, bound, most likely, for the North American market. The
flagless vessel is boarded in international waters and its cargo is found in
the search. Within days the Port of Houston will be entered by another
captured vessel in the "War on Drugs" and the illicit narcotics will be
destroyed. Meanwhile, the Latino crewmembers will spend time in
American courts and prisons as the crew of the Coast Guard cutter
proudly displays another marijuana leaf, painted on the deckhouse, in
recognition of this latest victory.
The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act ("MDLE")' and its
predecessor, the Marijuana on the High Seas Act ("MHSA"),2 have un-
questionably served to fulfill the policy of the United States government
in the protection of the American population. But what has been the
cost of this victory?
The extension of United States criminal jurisdiction to foreign na-
tionals in international waters is in conflict with the standards of custom-
1 46 U.S.C. §§ 1901-04 (1986).
2 21 U.S.C. §§ 955 a-d (1980)(transferred to 46 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1904 of Shipping Act (1987).
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ary international law. Both the MHSA and the MDLE (together, the
"Acts") permit actions outside the scope and letter of the current state of
customary international law. International consensus on the law of the
sea has recently been codified in the Third United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS III"). 3 UNCLOS III calls for inter-
national cooperation in the face of the growing international drug prob-
lem. The Acts provide U.S. courts with statutory justification of
unilateral action.
The United States is one of the few nations of the world that has not
signed the treaty. The Executive branch formally acceded to those parts
of the treaty which it believed reflected the trend of customary sea law.
The objection to UNCLOS III was primarily with the treaty's establish-
ment of an international regime for the exploitation of the mineral wealth
of the deep seabed.' The sections that were recognized by the United
States include those relevant to stateless vessels carrying cargoes of illicit
drugs on the high seas.' Thus, the United States has constructively made
itself a party to those elements of the UNCLOS III treaties.
This Note seeks to examine the conflict between the Acts and the
UNCLOS III. The policy goals of Congress are not questioned. With-
out a doubt, there is a drug problem in the United States.7 International
traffic in illicit drugs is clearly a threat to the security and well-being of
the people of the United States.' The question examined in this Note is
whether the Acts, their use by the Coast Guard, and their judicial en-
forcement by the courts is in conflict with international law. The under-
lying goal is to reconcile the American "War on Drugs" with
international law by highlighting the flaws in the enforcement of the Acts
and recognizing possible solutions to the conflicts with international law.
3 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature December 10, 1982,
U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS III].
4 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW Pt.V introductory note preceding
§ 501 at 5-6 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Federal lawmakers have formally recognized the problem in a series of legislative acts. The
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1986), comprehensively complied much of the legis-
lative action to date. P.L. 99-570, section 2019 of the act, "Drugs as a National Security Problem,"
is descriptive of the scope of the problem and is indicative of the extent to which the Congress
believes action must be taken. The section reads: "The Congress hereby declares that drugs are a
national security problem and urges the President to explore the possibility of engaging such essen-
tially security-oriented organizations as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in cooperative drug
programs
8 Id.
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II. THE MARIJUANA ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT AND THE MARITIME
DRUG ENFORCEMENT AcT
A. The MHSA
In 1981 the MHSA was enacted by Congress to close a loophole in
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 by
extending U.S. jurisdiction to persons on board vessels subject to U.S.
jurisdiction.10 The practical effect of the MHSA was to ensure the prose-
cution of U.S. citizens aboard U.S. and foreign registered vessels any-
where in international waters.1" The MHSA was also drafted to permit
the prosecution of foreign nationals aboard stateless vessels with illicit
drug cargoes traveling anywhere on the high seas with a showing of in-
tent to distribute their cargo in the United States.' 2
The language of the MHSA makes it "unlawful for any person on
board a vessel of the United States, or on board a vessel subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States on the high seas, to knowingly or inten-
tionally manufacture and distribute, or to possess the intent to manufac-
ture or distribute, a controlled substance."' 3 The section regarding the
"[i]ntent or knowledge of unlawful importation into the United States" 11
was included specifically to ensure that the appropriate scienter require-
ment of the MHSA was beyond question. In order to be found guilty of
violating the MHSA, the violator must have been consciously aware of,
and must have intended, the result of the illegal importation of controlled
substances into the territory of the United States.' 5
The MHSA was written to apply specifically both in the "customs
waters of the United States" and "beyond the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States."' 6 Jurisdiction was further defined as applying not
only to vessels "documented under the laws of the United States" but
also to "vessels without nationality.' 7
B. The MDLE
The MDLE is an amended version of the MHSA. The MHSA has
been replicated within the MDLE with four important changes. Con-
9 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1970).
10 See United States v. Riker, 670 F.2d 987 (1lth Cir. 1982)
11 21 U.S.C. §§ 955 a(a), b(d).
12 Id.
13 Id § 955 a(a); See The Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1986). This act pro-
vides a series of schedules relating types of narcotics to their appropriate penalties for possession.
Generally, the stronger the drug the stiffer the penalty.
14 21 U.S.C. 955 a(d).
15 Id §§ 955 a(a), a(d).
16 Id §§ 955 a(c), a(h).
17 Id §§ 955 b(c), b(d).
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gress felt it was necessary to give more force to the earlier legislation by
including, in section 1902, a declaration that "trafficking in controlled
substances is a serious international problem and is universally
condemned." 18
The second amendment contained in the MDLE deals with foreign
consent to U.S. officials boarding foreign flagged vessels.19 The MHSA
had not explicitly provided for the consensual process and had created
some jurisdictional questions in the courts.20  Specifically, this MHSA
amendment provided courts with explicit legislative direction to respect
jurisdiction gained by consent.21 Prior to the MDLE, an informal, non-
treaty, arrangement had been established whereby the Coast Guard
would establish radio, telephone, and electronic communications with
foreign governments to gain permission to board their flag vessels.22 The
MDLE now specified that this consent was sufficient to extend U.S.
jurisdiction.23
The third amendment adds striking language to the Act's force: "a
failure to comply with international law shall not divest a court of juris-
diction or otherwise constitute a defense to any proceeding under this
Act."2 4 This provision stands in direct conflict not only with interna-
tional law but also with the prevailing interpretation of international law
in U.S. courts.2"
The fourth change present in the MDLE is the explicit reference to
the 1958 Convention on the High Seas.26 Congress sought to ease doubt
about the international propriety of the seizure of stateless vessels by
resting the action on a foundation of international law. 27 Unfortunately,
18 46 U.S.C. § 1902.
19 Id § 1903 (c)(1)(C).
20 See United States v. Henriquez, 731 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Romero-
Galue, 757 F.2d 1147 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Gonzales, 776 F.2d 931 (1lth Cir. 1985)
21 46 U.S.C. § 1903(c)(1)(c).
22 See United States v. Ospina, 823 F.2d 429 (1 1th Cir. 1987). The facts of Ospina mirror the
nontreaty arrangement and were ratified by the 11th Circuit in accordance with the MDLE. Id. at
430.
23 Id. at 432.
24 46 U.S.C. § 1903(d).
25 See Note, Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act: An Analysis, 11 HAsTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 487, 502-04 (1988) (authored by Mary B. Neumayr). The Neumayr note provides a brief,
incisive examination of the MDLE. In particular, it is critical of§ 1903(d) and calls for the courts to
invalidate that provision. Id. at 507. Rather than limit the scope of examination to U.S. jurispru-
dence, this Note seeks to make a broader criticism by examining the Acts in the international con-
text of the UNCLOS III.
26 46 U.S.C. § 1903; Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S.
No. 2100, 450 U.N.T. 82 [hereinafter Convention on the High Seas].
27 United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255, 258 (lst Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983).
The court held that the United States had enacted customary international law by ratifying the 1958
Convention. Id.
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this foundation, the 1958 Convention, had already been eroded by the
UNCLOS III agreement. Although UNCLOS III has not been ratified
by the U.S. Senate and is technically not law in the United States, the
convention has been signed by a vast majority of the world's states28 and
in 1982 was acceded to in part by the Executive branch.
The MDLE provides clearer legislative guidance to the courts re-
garding jurisdictional questions than the MHSA had. With the legisla-
tive guidance of the MDLE, the courts were no longer compelled to
wrestle with the difficult questions of international law every time foreign
drug smuggler came before them. Unfortunately, the MDLE also makes
Congress' ignorance of the current state of customary international law
more explicit. Despite the MDLE's assertion to the contrary,29 there had
been no universal condemnation of drug trafficking, and UNCLOS III
now stands as the law of the -sea replacing the Convention on the High
Seas of 1958.
C. Legislative Purpose
Congress drafted the MHSA in order to ensure that extraterritorial
acts were within the scope of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act of 1970.30 Previously, a loophole had existed that inhib-
ited courts in acting against smugglers on the high seas. The 1970 Act
had not addressed the possession of controlled substances aboard vessels
anywhere beyond the customs waters.31 The MHSA corrected this error
by including both U.S. and foreign vessels lying beyond the customs
waters.32
The hearings on the MHSA, both in the House33 and the Senate,34
28 In December 1984 UNCLOS III was closed for signature with 159 signatures and 32 re-
corded ratifications. This universal approval of UNCLOS III was reiterated on September 5, 1986
when the U.N. General Assembly passed resolution 41/34 stating a resolve "to allow the effective
entry into force of the new legal regime for the uses of the sea" by a vote of 145 in favor, 2 opposed
(the United States and Turkey), and 5 abstentions. ANNuAL REVIEW OF U.N. AFA.is 221 (D.
Lincoff ed. 1986).
29 46 U.S.C. §§ 1902, 1903()(1)(C).
30 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966.
31 Anderson, Jurisdiction Over Stateless Vessels on the High Sear An Appraisal Under Domestic
and International Law, 13 J. MAR. L. & COM. 323, 342 (1982); "Customs Waters" are defined in 19
U.S.C. § 1401 (j) (1988) as meaning
in the case of a foreign vessel subject to a treaty or other arrangement between a foreign
government and the United States enabling or permitting the authorities of the United
States to board, examine, search, seize, or otherwise to enforce upon such vessel upon the
high seas the laws of the United States, the waters within such distance of the coast of the
United States as the said authorities are or may be so enabled or permitted by such treaty
or arrangement and, in the case of every other vessel, the waters within four leagues of the
coast of the United States.
32 United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 259 (1st Cir. 1982)
33 H.R. REP. No. 323, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 at 18 (1979).
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demonstrated that Congress sought to give "maximum prosecutorial au-
thority under international law to enforcement agencies". 35 The Justice
Department was concerned that "international law considerations re-
quire some nexus to the United States .... because drug trafficking is not
generally accepted as an international crime. 136 The knowledge and in-
tent elements were added to satisfy this concern.3v Nonetheless, drug
smugglers were seen as "modern day pirates, men and vessels without a
country.2
38
The MDLE was enacted in conjunction with the comprehensive
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. 39 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 is an
updated version of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Con-
trol Act of 1970.4 Congress produced the updated Act to strengthen
federal efforts directed at stopping the flow of illicit drugs into the United
States by strengthening federal programs and broadening existing federal
statutes such as the MHSA.41 The MDLE takes the MHSA's misplaced
legislative inertia a step further by specifically stating "that trafficking in
controlled substances aboard vessels is a serious international problem
and is universally condemned."'42
Jurisdiction was purposefully extended in the Acts to cover foreign
nationals manning stateless vessels.43 This previous judicial extension
was beyond Congressional authority.' The Constitution grants Con-
gress the authority to "define and punish Piracies and Felonies commit-
ted on the High Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations."'45
Congressional power is thus limited by the Constitution to actions within
the scope of international law.' Drug smugglers have not been placed in
the same category as pirates - hostes homini generis -, enemies of
34 S. REP. No. 855, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980).
35 Id
36 Id
37 Id
38 H.R. REP. No. 323, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979).
39 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1986).
40 21 U.S.C. § 801-971.
41 See Act of October 27, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS
(100 Stat.) 3207. See also: H.R. REP. No. 973, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); S. REP. No. 196, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
42 46 U.S.C. § 1902 (1986).
43 United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1114
(1983).
44 The Pacquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), The Nereide 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423
(1815); See generally Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States,
101 U. PA. L. REV. 26 (1952) (pt. 1).
45 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
46 Dickinson, supra note 44.
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humanity.47
The international community has yet to declare drug trafficking a
universal crime against humanity.48 The case law relying on the Acts
provides poignant examples of the tension created by Congress' failure to
adequately address this state of international law when it drafted domes-
tic law to handle drug traffickers.49
II. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE ACTS
The MHSA and the MDLE have created difficulties for domestic
courts due to their application to foreign nationals outside of U.S. juris-
diction. Courts must determine whether the law can be applied not only
in the specific circumstances involved but also in the larger realm of in-
ternational law.
A. Traditional Bases for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction over criminal activity is an element of national sover-
eignty. 0 It is an integral element of the makeup of statehood as an inter-
national phenomenon."' A state is a state, in part, because it has the
authority and ability to proscribe certain behavior within and outside of
its borders. 2 Though the purpose and means of a State's internal crimi-
nal law is often debated, especially by individuals in states with differing
and opposing ideological underpinnings, there is seldom a question re-
garding a State's right to act against its own citizens within its own terri-
tory.53 Difficulties arise, however, when a State chooses to act against
individuals so that effects are felt within other states. Should nations
choose to extend criminal jurisdiction extraterritorially, with no consid-
eration for the rights of other states, international chaos and conflict be-
tween sovereigns would ensue. 4 Consequently, some principles for
extraterritorial jurisdiction have arisen.5
47 J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 311 (6th ed. 1966). See also B. DUBNER, THE LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL SEA PIRACY (1980).
48 The UNCLOS III is historic in its universal character. Drug smugglers were directly ad-
dressed and were specifically excluded from the category of universal criminals in the UNCLOS III.
Pirates and slavetraders were, however, labeled as such. This issue will be discussed with greater
depth infra at notes 204-208 and accompanying text.
49 See infra notes 50-140 and accompanying text.
50 R. GILPIN, WAR AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS (1981); L. HENKIN, How NATIONS
BEHAVE (2d ed. 1979).
51 Id. at 21-23.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 22.
54 Note, High Seas Narcotics Smuggling and Section 955a of Title 21: Overextension of the
Protective Principle of Title 21: Over extension of the Protective Principle of International Jurisdiction,
50 FORDHAM L. REV. 688, 691 (1982) [hereinafter High Seas Narcotics Smuggling].
55 See generally H.STEINER & D. VAGTs, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS (2d ed. 1975);
1990]
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International law has recognized a series of principles that extend
the jurisdiction of states. 56 While different texts often give them different
titles and provide different distinctions between principles,5 7 five different
principles have been settled upon: nationality, territoriality, the effects
principle, the protective principle, and the universality principle.5 8 In
The Pacquette Habana59 the U.S. Supreme Court made these principles
applicable in U.S. courts: "International law is a part of our law, and
must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice .... 
The nationality principle provides a State with jurisdiction over its
own nationals, wherever such offenses might be committed. This princi-
ple is accepted by all states.61 In the United States there is a presumption
against extraterritorial application of criminal law to nationals when the
crimes are against individuals, but a presumption exists for extraterrito-
rial application when the crime committed is against the state.62
The territoriality principle confers jurisdiction upon a State over of-
fenses committed within its territory.63 The ability of a sovereign to de-
fine and punish offenses within its territorial limits is absolute. 6  The
United States adheres to the "objective" view of territoriality, which was
first enunciated and applied domestically within the United States by the
Supreme Court in Strassheim v. Daily,65 the principle infers territoriality
to intentional acts initiated outside a territory but intended to have their
effects within a territory.66 Justice Holmes' opinion in Strassheim has
been extended to cover not only interstate but also international jurisdic-
J.L. BRIERLY, supra note 47; A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1977); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972); RESTATEMENT, supra note
4.
56 REsTATEMENT, supra note 4, §§ 402, 403.
57 Id.
58 I,
59 175 U.S. 677. Justice Gray relied upon ancient principles of international law to determine
that Cuban coastal fishing vessels were not subject to U.S. military capture during the Spanish-
American War.
60 Id. at 700.
61 See STEINER & VAGTS, supra note 55; Harvard Research Into International Law, Jurisdic-
tion with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. Spec. Supp. 435, 445 (1935).
62 RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 402 comment f.
63 United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922). The defendant in Bowman was a U.S.
national who had defrauded a corporation in which the United States was a stockholder. Despite
the fact that the fraudulent activities took place on the high seas and in Brazil, the Court held that
the government's right to protect itself from fraud or obstruction justified an inference of extraterri-
toriality. The Court felt that to limit the relevant statutes to a territorial application provide a
loophole of sorts for nationals living abroad or acting on the high seas. Id. at 98.
64 Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 234 (1804).
65 221 U.S. 280 (1911). Daily fraudulently sold machinery in Illinois that he knew wa bound
for Michigan. The Court allowed Michigan jurisdiction. Id. at 281.
66 Id.
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tion. 7 A State can thus punish the offense of a foreign actor which is felt
within its territory.
The effects principle is an offshoot of the territoriality principle.6"
As long as the criminal act is intended to have a substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effect within the United States and there is some reasonable
jurisdictional nexus, criminal jurisdiction over it may exist regardless of
where the act took place.69 There is a strong presumption against the use
of the effects principle to extend criminal jurisdiction into other states
when the acts are predominately those of nationals of those other
states. 0 U.S. government law enforcement agencies have been directed
to extend jurisdiction "sparingly" and only upon "strong justification. 71
Consent of the foreign state is generally required to permit U.S. criminal
law enforcement agents to act outside a U.S. territory.72 This includes
consent to board foreign flag vessels in the search for illicit drugs outside
of U.S. customs waters.73
The protective principle allows the extension of jurisdiction over for-
eign nationals whose acts threaten the security of the State or affect a
State's interests.74 This is a broad category and has been used to reach
foreign nationals who have violated MHSA,75 despite the fact that crimes
against State interests are generally limited under international law to
offenses such as espionage, counterfeiting a State's official seal, falsifica-
tion of official documents, violation of immigration laws, and perjury
before consular officials.76 This category of crimes concerns the State's
interest in effective interstate administrative processes. Drug smuggling
does not fit into this category of crimes against State interests.
The universality principle provides jurisdiction over criminals of any
nationality who are held in their custody for committing crimes against
humanity. Such criminals are hostes homini generis.Y7 Their crimes in-
dude, and are limited to, those that are of a universal concern and have
an effect on the whole community of nations.7" Specifically, slave trade,
piracy, attacks on, or hijacking of aircraft, and genocide are universal
67 RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 402(l)(c).
68 Id. § 403.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id § 403 and § 403 reporters' note 8.
72 Id. § 432.
73 Id § 433 reporters' note 4.
74 Id. § 402 comment f.
75 See High Seas Narcotics Smuggling, supra note 54.
76 RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 402 comment f.
77 Id. § 404.
78 Id Drug smuggling is specifically excluded from the list of universal crimes. A state must
use some other justification for extraterritorial extension of criminal laws to pertain to foreign
nationals.
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crimes 79 for which any state can extend jurisdiction. Despite a common
belief in the United States that "there is a growing consensus among na-
tions to include drug trafficking as a universally prohibited crime,""0
there is not a formal international declaration to that effect. In fact, most
recent multilateral discussions of controls on drug trafficking specifically
avoid alluding to drug offenses as universal crimes."1
The seizing of foreign nationals aboard stateless vessels on the high
seas does not fall neatly into any of the above listed traditional justifica-
tions for extraterritorial extension of criminal jurisdiction. Yet, without
some degree of multilateral cooperation sanctioning U.S. activity, the
Acts and the reliance on them by the Coast Guard and the courts are
questionable under international law. Most U.S. courts rely on a broad
reading of international law in their extension of authority in such
cases. 2 Admittedly, however, when faced with evidence, suspects, and a
Congressional mandate it is difficult for any U.S. court not to act, despite
the lack of neatness in decision making. As a result, there is no strict
adherence to, and even a lack of respect for, the tenets of international
customary and conventional law. 3
In summary, while the MHSA and MDLE provide a quick, clean
method for dealing with foreign nationals picked up on the high seas, the
Acts also place U.S. courts outside the regime of international order.
However justified it may be, unilateral efforts to create some order out of
the chaos 4 on the seas by the United States upsets the traditional inter-
national order.8 5 The United States' desire to correct a heinous interna-
tional phenomenon through domestic legal action is contrary to, and
does harm to, the development of both international customary and
treaty law.
B. Customary International Law in United States Courts
International law is, and must be, a part of U.S. law. From the
earliest developments of the United States as a nation, the law of nations
79 Id.
80 679 F.2d at 1378.
81 International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Drug Trafficking, June 26, 1987. 26
I.L.M. 1637. The language of the final document specifically called for cooperation amongst states
as realized in bilateral and multilateral agreements. Id. at 1645 and 1706. There was an express
concern that the actions of individual states not conflict with other states' constitutional, legal, and
administrative systems. Id. at 1692. In spite of the claims that a consensus on drug trafficking's
criminal universality exists, it clearly does not. Too many states have a dependency upon the reve-
nue from the production of drugs and subsequently have developed alternative cultural and moral
approaches to illicit narcotics production and distribution.
82 See High Seas Narcotics Smuggling, supra note 54.
83 See infra notes 87-140 accompanying text.
84 Anderson, supra note 31, at 342.
85 See High Seas Narcotics Smuggling, supra note 54, at 719.
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was an integral part of American jurisprudence. 6 There is a tension in
the constitutional system between the judicial and legislative branches.8 7
Courts do not have the prerogative to act as foreign policy bodies by
interpreting international law contrary to executive and legislative for-
eign policy-" However, courts do have the ability and the responsibility
to interpret both customary and treaty-based international law.8 9
International law, as a body of law, is not superior to Congress, but
customary international law is equal in authority to an Act of Con-
gress.9 Customary law is "self-executing" and does not require specific
congressional ratification to become a part of U.S. law.91 The United
States participates daily in the creation of customary international
norms.
In The Decay of International Law,92 Professor A. Carty provides
the following definition of customary international law as follows:
Law is a matter of concrete practice and not simply an expression of
national will - that is to say, law is customary. Custom has two essen-
tial stages, legal consciousness, as the inner'ground, and then external
conduct and practice. National legal consciousness has to be set in a
universal perspective because the idea of law as such exists at a world
level. 93
Domestic laws need not stand in the way of courts' adherence to new
international customary norms. Professor Henkin writes that "courts
should continue to give effect to developments in international law to
which the United States is part, unless Congress is moved to reject them
as domestic law in the United States." 94 U.S. courts must be ever vigi-
lant to their role as interpreters of law and not simply become the mouth-
pieces of transient national policy decisions.
If there is a conflict between domestic law and developing custom-
ary law, courts must examine whether the United States has formally
disassociated itself from the process of development.95 In the case of
UNCLOS III, for example, the United States has specifically stated a
disavowal of the new deep seabed regime, but has accepted the other
provisions as customary law that simply modify previously existing
86 Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MicH. L. REv. 1555, 1569
(1984).
87 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 & 2, and art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
88 Id
89 Id
90 Henkin, supra note 86, at 1566.
91 Id
92 A. CARTY, The Decay of International Law (1986).
93 Id. at 32.
94 Henkin, supra note 86.
95 RE TATEMENT, supra note 4, § 115 comment b.
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treaty and custom.96 Further, domestic statutes are to be construed, as
much as possible, so as to avoid conflict with international law.9 7 Even if
an international norm has been superseded by domestic law, it does not
relieve the United States of its international obligation or from the poten-
tial consequences of a violation.98 Clearly, courts have a duty to examine
and understand international norms and their effect upon domestic legal
action. 99
United States courts have been inconsistent in their interpretation of
customary international norms."° This, in turn, has hindered the devel-
opment of international law and raised questions about the role of the
United States as a law-abiding nation in the international community. 101
This judicial inconsistency is occurring in conjunction with a reevalua-
tion of the term "custom" to more closely reflect U.S. political values.
As multilateral fora, such as the United Nations, produce norms con-
trary to U.S. policy, the U.S. foreign policy establishment has come to
place greater value in customary international law and less emphasis on
legislated doctrine.102 Inconsistency in courts can perhaps be attributed
to a lack of consistency on the part of U.S. policy makers in taking posi-
tions on specific aspects of international law.
Judicial interpretations and use of the Acts illustrate this confusion
and inconsistency. Customary international law is generally adhered to
by the United States. But the degree to which customary international
law supersedes domestic legislation, and the degree to which it super-
sedes the Acts, has varied from courtroom to courtroom.
C. Illustrative Cases
Two tracks exist in the cases dealing with the application of the Acts
96 See Id § 115, comment d; See also id introductory note preceding § 501.
97 Id § 114.
98 Id § 115.
99 See Henkin, supra note 86.
100 Note, Customary International Law in the United States Courts, 32 VILL. L. REv. 1089,
1126 (1987).
101 There is a long history of U.S. involvement in the development of international treaty and
customary law. The U.S. has been a vital player in the development of many of the contemporary
regimes for order and commerce in the international community. See eg. T. FRANCK, NATION
AGAINST NATION (1985); R. JACKSON, THE NON-ALIGNED, THE UN, AND THE SUPERPOWERS
(1983); P. KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS (1987); KEOHANE, ASTER
HEGEMONY (1984); R.O. KEOHANE & J. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLI-
TICS IN TRANSITION (1977); S. KRASNER, STRUCTURAL CONFLICT: THE THIRD WORLD AGAINST
GLOBAL LIBERALISM (1985). In many instances, the United States has been a leader in such en-
deavors, much to its credit and to the benefit of world peace and harmony. As a world leader, the
U.S. must establish a consistency as regards its approach to global legal regimes. The world commu-
nity must be able to anticipate the legal and policy decisions of the great powers.
102 Reisman, The Cult of Custom in the Late 20th Century, 17 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 133, 135
(1987).
Vol. 22:375
DRUG SMUGGLING VESSELS
to stateless vessels on the high seas. The first track, termed the "reason-
able nexus" track, requires some evidence of intent to smuggle the illicit
drugs on board the vessel into the United States. The second track,
termed the "international pariah" track, requires only that the vessel be
stateless and carrying contraband in order to extend jurisdiction and ap-
ply the Act to its crewmembers.
Prior to the enactment of the MHSA, the two tracks were found in
judicial decisions. Two district court cases exemplify the "reasonable
nexus" track. In United States v. May May103 the court determined that,
since charts found in the deckhouse projected a track leading to the
United States, there was enough evidence to extend jurisdiction over a
vessel found 135 miles off the Texas coast."° In United States v. Egan 105
the court invoked the protective principle to convict foreign
crewmembers of a stateless drug smuggling vessel picked up thirty miles
off the Long Island coast." 6 In both of these decisions the court required
some degree of reasonable evidence of a nexus to the United States to
convict foreign nationals.
The "international pariah" track is illustrated through United States
v. Ricardo.0 7 Despite a lack of evidence of intent to distribute, the Fifth
Circuit found that five Colombian crewmen could be prosecuted for hav-
ing been on board a stateless vessel bearing illicit drugs that had been
seized 150 miles from the U.S. coast.' The Fifth Circuit did not require
any overt or alleged act or effect in the United States to allow
conviction. 09
Of the cases heard after the enactment of the MHSA most, but not
all, belong in the second track. These decisions seem to rely on the
MHSA as a green light in convicting foreign nationals seized aboard
stateless drug smuggling vessels. In United States v. Angola," 0 the Court
convicted crewmen from a stateless vessel found 350 miles from U.S.
waters without any showing of intent to enter the United States."' The
protective principle was invoked by Judge Spellman: "These are real
threats to this country, not merely hypothecated [sic], but supported by
dozens of cases of detected drug smuggling." '112 To this court, the state-
103 470 F. Supp. 384 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
104 Id at 392, 396.
105 501 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
106 Id. at 1252, 1256.
107 619 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1980.
108 Id. at 1127, 1131.
109 Id. at 1129.
110 514 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
111 Id. at 936.
112 Id.
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less vessel was an international pariah and its crewmen were clearly
prosecutable under the Act.
Nonetheless, a month later, Judge Davis of the same district court
wrote what now stands as the exemplar "reasonable nexus" decision. In
United States v. James-Robinson113 the crewmen of a stateless vessel
seized 400 miles from the U.S. coast were found to be not prosecutable
since there was an insufficient nexus to the United States to warrant an
extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction.114 Judge Spellman examined
the MHSA and its legislative history, and determined that Congress had
not sought to supersede existing international law, but to act within it." 5
Thus, the court felt compelled to examine the situation from the perspec-
tive of international law without regard to the policy decision embodied
in the Act.116 Judge Davis determined that the protective principle sim-
ply did not extend so far as to allow an extension of jurisdiction in this
situation:
[The situation] boils down to whether, as a matter of law the presence
of foreign crewmen on a stateless ship carrying marijuana on the high
seas 400 miles from the United States by definition represents a threat
to our national security or to our government's functions. It does not.
More than that must be alleged and proven.' 1 7
The "reasonable nexus" track quickly fell out of favor, however, as
courts sought to take advantage of the prosecutorial effect provided by
Congress in the MHSA.
In a "nontraditional analytic approach" 18 the Eleventh Circuit con-
cluded that, since drug trafficking was "universally prohibited crime," '119
international law permitted the extension of jurisdiction over stateless
vessels on the high seas. 120 In United States v. Marino-Garcia,12 1 the
Eleventh Circuit faced a fact situation similar to those considered by
Judges Davis and Spellman in the Southern District of Florida. The
Coast Guard cutter Dependable, establishing its acclaimed reputation as
"the scourge of drug traffickers plying the Caribbean",12 2 seized the
small freighter, Four Roses, and its cargo of 57,000 pounds of marijuana
65 miles off the coast of Cuba and 300 miles from Florida.' There was
113 515 F. Supp. 1340 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
114 Id. at 1347.
115 Id. at 1343.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 1346.
118 Note, Recent Cases, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 292, 309 (1983) [hereinafter, Recent Cases].
119 679 F.2d at 1381.
120 Id.
121 679 F.2d at 1373.
122 Id. at 1378 n.2.
123 Id.
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no evidence to indicate that the cargo was intended for the United
States. 24 The vessel was registered in Honduras under a different name
and displayed the homeport "Miami, Florida" on its bow. The court
determined that the vessel, having asserted a false registration, was to be
considered stateless under international law and the MHSA.'2 5 None of
the crewmen were aware of the Honduran registry, and the boat did not
fly Honduran colors. All of the crewmen were foreign nationals1 6 and
jurisdiction was extended. 27
Judge Johnson's opinion in Marino-Garcia was nontraditional be-
cause it read the MHSA literally and gave little credence to either do-
mestic or international legal precedent. The opinion held that Congress
had been correct in judging that the MHSA did not conflict with interna-
tional law.' In fact, Judge Johnson opined that the attempts by other
courts to apply the traditional principles was irrelevant since stateless
vessels are "international pariahs,"' 2 9 open to inspection and seizing by
any state, and persons aboard are subject to prosecution by the seizing
state. 13
Judge Johnson's opinion contrasts with Judge Davis's holding in
James-Robinson,' which was concerned with the lack of danger posed
by the stateless vessel to the United States. 132 In Marino-Garcia, Judge
Johnson found that concern to be irrelevant; no nexus to the United
States need be required. 133 As a matter of law, the MHSA allowed the
United States to stop and seize any vessel anywhere on the high seas
from Cuba to the Indian Ocean. For those like Judge Johnson who con-
sider such vessels to be international pariahs, anything less would permit
chaos and deny order on the high seas. 34
Having determined that international law in no way restricts the
right of the United States to assert jurisdiction over stateless vessels on
the high seas, we hold that Section 955a properly extends the criminal
jurisdiction of this country to any stateless vessel in international wa-
ters engaged in the distribution of controlled substances.' 35
Relying on Marino-Garcia other circuits have also followed the "interna-
124 Id
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 515 F. Supp. at 1346.
132 Id.
133 679 F.2d at 1380.
134 See Anderson, supra note 31; Recent Cases, supra note 118.
135 679 F.2d. at 1383.
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tional pariah" track and established it as the dominant precedent for ex-
amining facts in light of either the MHSA or the MDLE.136
There is, however, a distinct flaw in the reading of the relevant inter-
national law in these courts. All these decisions are based on treaty law
established in the 1958 Convention of the High Seas. 13 7 Discussions or
acknowledgements of UNCLOS III in any of the decisions do not exist.
Though the United States has failed to ratify the later treaty, it has acqui-
esced to the majority of its substantive elements. 138  UNCLOS III is a
new, more universal, phenomenon than the 1958 Convention. The sub-
stance of the customary law codified in UNCLOS III existed before the
MHSA was drafted, 139 and UNCLOS III was signed by a large majority
of the world's states well before the MDLE was even considered. 14°
Both the precedent settled upon in judicial decisions and the legislative
direction relevant to the prosecution of foreign nationals seized aboard
stateless vessels on the high seas by the United States Coast Guard and
136 See, e.g., United States v. Stuart-Caballero, 686 F.2d 890 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 1202 (1983) (U.S. can extend jurisdiction absent proof of intent to distribute in the U.S.);
United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255 (1st Cir. 1982) (stresses that as a signatory of 1958 Convention
on the High Seas, the U.S. has enacted customary international law, and has authority to seize
stateless vessels on the high seas); United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1983): 21
U.S.C. § 955a (stateless vessel seized 100 miles off coast of Nantucket); United States v. Del Prado-
Montero, 740 F.2d 113 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 441 (1984) (extension of posse comita-
tus allowed Navy vessel to assist Coast Guard in drug interdiction of stateless vessel on high seas);
United States v. Alvarez-Mena, 765 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1985) (stateless vessel seized off Yucatan
Peninsula by Coast Guard, jurisdiction extended solely by virtue of its statelessness). See also Note,
Bringing in the Mother Lode: The Second Circuit Rides in the Wake of the Marino-Garcia-United
States v. Pinto-Mejia, 10 MAR. LAW. 141 (1985); Note, Drug Enforcement on the High Sear Stateless
Vessel Jurisdiction over Shipboard Criminality by Nonresident Alien Crewmembers-United States v.
Alvarez-Mena, 11 MAR. LAW. 163 (1986).
Alvarez-Mena filled a gap in the doctrine of stateless vessel jurisdiction as developed by
the Second, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits. Each of those courts had assumed that juris-
diction over a stateless vessel carried with it jurisdiction over the ship's non-resident alien
crew. The Alvarez-Mena court became the first to confront the question of whether such
an assumption was warranted.
Id. at 175-76.
It is readily seen that the rights denied the vessel are just as surely denied to the crew
of the ship. In reality, it is the crewmembers of a stateless ship who are deprived of the
right to participate in legitimate trade as long as they are aboard such a ship. Similarly, the
vessel's statelessness subjects both the ship and its crew to any nation's jurisdiction.
Id. at 177; Note, The Navy's Role in Interdicting Narcotics Traffic" War on Drugs or Ambush on
Constitution, 75 GEo. L.J. 1947 (1987); Keig, A Proposal for Direct Use of the United States Military
in Drug Enforcement Operations Abroad, 23 TEx. INT'L LJ. 291 (1988). In United States v. Gonza-
les, 810 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1987), the Eleventh Circuit has indicated a continuing concern for a
reasonable territorial nexus indicating that a jury could find that a stateless drug smuggling vessel in
the Caribbean heading north was on its way to the United States, 810 F.2d at 1542.
137 See, RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, Pt.V introductory note preceding § 501 at 5-6.
138 Id
139 UNCLOS III was drafted between 1972-79. The MHSA was drafted in 1979-80.
140 UNCLOS III was signed in December 1982. The MDLE was written in 1985.
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naval vessels stands in conflict with the spirit and letter of UNCLOS III.
In order to better appreciate the questionable legality of the Acts, it is
necessary to examine the current state of customary international law as
embodied in UNCLOS IlI.
III. THE THIRD UNrTED NATIONS CONVENTION
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA.
The Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UN-
CLOS III") is a unique historical phenomenon. It is both a legal treaty
upon which affairs between states are peacefully conducted and a highly
charged political manifesto. This dual nature has both charmed and
harmed the acceptance and utility of UNCLOS III. For much of the
world's community of nations, the final UNCLOS III document repre-
sents a massive codification of customary and prior treaty sea law.141
For a few other states, most notably the United States, UNCLOS III is
fatally flawed because of its failure to reflect real power in the world
scene.
142
Despite the failure of the United States to sign the UNCLOS III, the
Convention is international law applicable to all the world's states.14 3
Though the treaty has not been presented by the President to the Con-
gress for ratification, the United States has acquiesced to those portions
of the treaty not concerned with the international exploitation of the
deep seabed. 14 The United States, as a law-abiding member of the com-
141 Malone, The United States and the Law of the Sea, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 785, 804 (1984)
[hereinafter The United States and the Law of the Sea].
142 Darman, The Law of the Sea: Rethinking U.S. Interests, 56 FOREIGN AMi. 373, 388 (1978).
143 The United States and the Law of the Sea, supra note 140; Ratiner, The Law of the Sea: A
Crossroads for American Foreign Policy 60 FOREIGN AFF. 1006 (1982).
144 RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, Pt. V introductory note preceding § 501 at 5 states in perti-
nent part:
As of 1987 the Convention was not yet in force, and, after it's entry into force, it will apply
to the United States only if the United States becomes a party to it.
For purposes of this Restatement, therefore, the Convention as such is not law of the
United States. However, many of the provisions of the Convention follow closely provi-
sions in the 1958 Conventions to which the United States is a party and which largely
restated customary law as of that time. Other provisions of the LOS Convention set forth
rules that, if not law in 1958, became customary law since that time, as they were accepted
at the Conference by consensus and have influenced, and came to reflect, the practice of
states. (cites omitted) In particular, in March 1983 President Reagan proclaimed a 200-
nautical-mile exclusive economic zone for the United States and issued a policy statement
in which the United States in effect agreed to accept the substantive provisions of the Con-
vention, other than those dealing with deep sea-bed mining, in relation to all states that do
so with respect to the United States. 19 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Does. 383 (1983), 83 Dep't
State Bull., No. 2075, at 70-71 (1983), 22 I.L.M. 464 (1983). Thus, by express or tacit
agreement accompanied by consistent practice, the United States, and States generally,
have accepted the substantive provisions of the Conventions, other than those addressing
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munity of nations, should acknowledge the existence of UNCLOS III in
its conduct of foreign affairs. Nonetheless, the method by which the
Congress has sought to interdict the traffic in illicit drugs on the high
seas by stateless vessels, the Coast Guard armed with the MHSA and the
MDLE, has failed to acknowledge UNCLOS III.
International trafficking in illicit drugs on the high seas is specifi-
cally addressed in UNCLOS III. 4 Taking heed of this language and the
spirit behind its drafting would serve the U.S. effort to halt the flow of
drugs across its borders.
A. The Spirit of the UNCLOS II
In order to appreciate the new spirit reflected in the UNCLOS III
document, some historical perspective is required. Contemporary mari-
time law, like much of modem international law, has its roots primarily
in Western Europe.' 46 Early Roman emperors asserted that they had
control over the seas in their domain and could control them at will.14
After the Dark Ages, the Europeans, especially the merchant traders of
the Italian city-states, left their continent aboard ships to find fortune
elsewhere.' 48 Trade routes and the territoriality of the seas became vig-
orously disputed issues. 49
The great mercantilist empires also claimed sovereignty over much
of the world's watery space just as the Romans had. In the fifteenth
century Papal Bulls and the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494 divided the
oceans between the Spanish and the Portuguese and gave the North At-
lantic to the Danes. 150
In 1663, Hugo Grotius, a lawyer employed by the Dutch govern-
ment to help break the Portuguese monopoly on the spice trade, wrote a
landmark brief, Mare Liberum.' 51 Writing that "[b]y the Law of Na-
tions navigation is free to all persons whatsoever,"' 52 this brief estab-
lished the tradition of the freedom of the high seas.
The freeing of the seas encouraged the merchant and naval fleets of
deep sea-bed mining, as statements of customary law binding upon them apart from the
Convention. Id.
145 UNCLOS III, supra note 3, art. 108.
146 M. AKEHURsT, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, 13 (5th ed. 1984);
See also C.J. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (6th ed. 1967); G. MANGONE,
LAW FOR THE WORLD OCEAN (1981); R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA (1988);
C. SANGER, ORDERING THE OCEANS (1987).
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 See generally Ratiner, supra note 143; Ball, Law of the Sea: Expression of Solidarity, 19 SAN
DIEGO L. Rnv. 461 (1982); M. AKEHURST, supra note 146, at 278.
151 H. GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM (THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS) (R. Magoffin trans. 1916).
152 Id. at 7.
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Western Europe to spread both the tradition and the primacy of this
European sea law throughout the globe. Europe's colonies, regardless of
their indigenous legal institutions, were "civilized" into the use of the
metropolitan European legal systems.'53 States had sovereignty over
coastal waters to a distance of three miles and travel on the high seas
could be restricted by no state. The high seas had become the crowded
highways of international trade in raw materials and products of the in-
dustrial revolution.' 54 The British naval fleet helped ensure Pax Britan-
nica by maintaining its version of law and order on the high seas.' 5'
At the end of World War II the Pax Americana replaced its elder
British cousin.'5 6 This new hegemon also held sway over the oceans. 157
Ocean-going commerce continued to expand and soon came to encom-
pass new areas of wealth in oil and fisheries.' Unlike the British, how-
ever, the Americans deviated from the Grotian tradition. 5 9
In 1945, desiring to protect the oil wealth beneath its extensive con-
tinental shelf,'6° the United States altered the tradition of sea law with
the Truman Proclamation. 6' By claiming that the continental shelf be-
neath the sea was national property out to a depth of 200 meters, Presi-
dent Truman changed the old rules of coastal territoriality and freedom
of the seas.162
Following suit in 1950 several Latin American states extended their
territorial zones to distances of up to 200 miles.' 63 Many other States
settled on a new twelve mile limit.16 Where there had been Grotian
order, confusion and conflict now existed. Control of the wealth of the
seas became a central policy tenet of many states.' 65
In 1958 and 1960 the United Nations sponsored the first two Law of
the Sea conferences in Geneva. States recognizing a three mile limit to
coastal sovereignty unsuccessfully sought to translate their concept into
153 See R. GiLpiN, supra note 50, at 31.
154 Id.
155 Ia&
156 See generally P. KENNEDY, supra note 101; R.O. KEOHANE & J. NYE, supra note 101; R.
GILPIN, supra note 50.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 L. HENKiN, supra note 50, at 213.
160 Id.
161 Id.; See also Ball, supra note 150, 471-72.
162 Id.
163 Id.; See also The Declaration of Montevideo, U.N. Doc. A/AC 138/34, 9 I.L.M. 1081
(1971); The Declaration of Lima, U.N. Doc. A/AC 138/28, 10 I.L.M. 207 (1971); The Declaration
of Santo Domingo, U.N. Doc. A/AC 138/80, 11 I.L.M. 892 (1972).
164 L. HENKiN, supra note 50.
165 Id.
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law in 1958.166 The later conference failed to agree on a compromise six-
mile territorial limit.167 The 1958 conference did, however, produce the
substantive document upon which Congress based the international le-
gality of the MHSA and the MDLE. 161
In 1967, the Soviet Union approached its American rival with a pro-
posal for a new treaty conference. Seizing upon this rare concurrence
interest, Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta made a stirring proposal to
the U.N. General Assembly.1 69 He proposed that a new and comprehen-
sive treaty be negotiated to cover all areas of concern in the oceans, in-
cluding the "futuristic" exploitation of the deep seabed.1 70 It was hoped
that not only traditional ocean transit rights would be agreed upon, but
also that conflicts like France and Brazil's "Lobster War" and the Brit-
ish-Icelandic "Cod War" could be averted by a new treaty.1 71
Ambassador T.B. Koh, head of the Delegation of the Singapore and
Chairman of the UNCLOS III Conferences, provides an insider's per-
spective on the many elements that combined to make Pardo's proposal a
reality:
By 1970, it was clear to all that the old legal order had collapsed.
Support for the convening of a Third U.N. Conference on the Law of
the Sea, therefore, seemed logical and timely. First, the Conference
was needed to resolve the unfinished business of the First and Second
U.N. Conferences, viz, the limit of the territorial sea and the limit of
the fishing zone, and to replace the exploitability criterion with a more
precise criterion. Second, it was necessary to replace the chaos created
by the unilateral and conflicting claims of coastal States with a new
legal order. Third, the great maritime powers, especially the two su-
perpowers, felt the need for a new internationally agreed upon regime
for the passage of ships and aircraft through and over straits used for
international navigation. Fourth, the newly independent countries of
the Third World wanted a new conference so that they could partici-
pate in the progressive development of this branch of international law.
Fifth, the international community had to agree on rules as well as
institutions, for the exploitation of the mineral resources in the seabed
and on the ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Last,
the historic Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment and a
series of accidents involving oil tankers had raised the world's con-
166 Id.
167 Id. at 214-15.
168 Convention on the High Seas, supra note 26.
169 See Pardo, Before and After, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95 (1983).
170 Id.
171 "Lobster War" and "Cod War" refer, respectively, to the 1960s conflicts between the
United Kingdom and Iceland over cod fisheries off the Icelandic coast and between France and
Brazil over lobster beds off the Brazilian coast. See R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 146, at
128, 310.
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sciousness regarding the threat to the marine environment; conse-
quently, there was a desire to adopt new rules to protect and preserve
that environment. 7 2
A more strident, developing country vision of purpose is described
by Professor Rembe, a lecturer in law at the University of Dar es Salaam,
in his introduction to Africa and the International Law of the Sea:
International law is in a period of transition from a European law to a
more universal or quasi-universal law governing diverse subjects and
reflecting a wide range of fields. In this heuristic stage, international
law is emerging as a discipline of considerable interest to many States,
particularly to the newly independent nations....
The above view does not, however, mean that the new States are
satisfied with, and accept the whole body of international law. There
has been a phase of reaction against traditional international law which
sanctified relationships that are the sources of current problems in
these countries. The origins, development and functions of traditional
international law have been indissolubly linked and identified with
colonialism and imperialism, responsible for the present and past op-
pression and exploitation of the new states. International law therefore
poses an obstacle to the realization of economic and social reconstruc-
tion, as well as international development. 173
Clearly, the negotiations for the UNCLOS III took on a much
larger international role than simply that of a sea treaty. It was a discus-
sion of global import in which all the nations of the world, not simply the
great powers, played an integral and decisive role. In a world commu-
nity only just emerging from neocolonialism, the UNCLOS III negotia-
tions were held out as a model for the future of international relations.
The sea, next to the sun and air, is the most widely shared, uniform
aspect of the physical environment. I wonder whether the conceptual
systems of diverse cultures ought not to have the greatest conver-
gence-or the least divergence-along the front of interaction with the
common factor of the sea. If so, perhaps international, multicultural
negotiations regarding the sea may thus enjoy some natural, cohesive
predisposition to the possibility of mutual understanding. It may
prove then that negotiations revolving around the sea may constitute a
further, common basis for attempts at mutual understanding on other
subjects. In any event, I think it well worth noting the singular shape
taken by the conference.
1 74
172 Koh, Negotiating a New World Order for the Sea, 24 VA. J. INT'L. L. 761, 767-68 (1984).
173 N. REMBE, AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (1980), at IX; see also
Yuan, The New Convention on the Law of the Sea from the Chinese Perspective, in CONSENSUS AND
CONFRONTATION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION (Van Dyke ed.
1984).
174 Ball, supra note 150, at 463.
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These international political forces that shaped UNCLOS III con-
fficted with domestic political forces. This political and ideological con-
ffict provides a framework for understanding the international and
domestic environments within which the law embodied in both UN-
CLOS III and the Acts was crafted.
The forces that had been working to bring about the end of the ne-
ocolonial era in world politics saw the UNCLOS III negotiations as an
opportunity17 5 to codify and further institutionalize their goal of creating
a New International Economic Order ("NIEO"). 1 7 6 The NIEO is a plan
for a revolutionary alteration of the world economy based on large scale
redistribution of wealth from the developed to the developing world. 177
The redistribution of wealth in the NIEO plan was at odds with con-
servative ideology espoused by the Reagan Administration.1 71 The pres-
ence of NIEO-inspired language, especially the notion of the high seas as
the "common heritage of mankind," '17 9 and programs, especially the Au-
thority established to coordinate deep seabed mining operations, led to
the decision not to sign the Final Document by the United States.18
The United States had participated in the UNCLOS III process
from the very beginning. The U.S. delegation had played a leadership
role in shaping both the style of negotiation and its final product.1"1 As
early as 1966, President Johnson warned that the deep seabed ought not
become the object of a new colonialism, but be a "legacy for all human
175 See generally Anand, Odd Man Out: The United States and the UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea and Emergence of New Third World States and US. Isolation, in CONSENSUS AND CON-
FRONTATION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION (J. Van Dyke ed.
1985).
176 Burke & Brokaw, Ideology and the Law of the Sea, in Law of the Sea, U.S. Policy Dilemma
(B. Oxman, 0. Caron & C. Buderi eds. 1983).
177 See generally J.A. HART, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1983); Jordan,
Why a NIEO? The View From the Third World, in THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORDER (H. Jacobson & D. Sidjanski eds. 1982); Rist, The Not-So-New International Order, in NEw
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: A THIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVE (P.K. Ghosh ed. 1984); and
Dupuy, The Convention on the Law of the Sea and the New International Economic Order, 3/4
IMPACT OF SCIENCE ON Soc'y 313 (1983).
178 Malone, Who Needs the Sea Treaty, 54 FOREIGN PoL'Y 44 (1984) [hereinafter Who Needs
the Sea Treaty].
179 UNCLOS III, supra note 3, art. 37. This Article established an area beyond sovereign
control the exploitation of which would benefit all the world's states and within which no one state
could exert control. The text states:
[a]ll rights in the resources in the area are vested in mankind as a whole, on whose behalf
the Authority shall act.... No State or natural of juridical person shall claim, acquire, or
exercise rights with respect to the minerals recovered from the Area except in accordance
with this Part ....
Id at 42. See also Ball, supra note 150, at 471; L. Henkin, supra note 50, at 200.
180 Malone, supra note 141, at 789.
181 Ratiner, supra note 143.
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beings." 18 2 In the face of this prior, long term U.S. support for UN-
CLOS III, the Reagan Administration's rejection of the UNCLOS III
has been labeled a short term victory of "pure conservative ideology.' ' 18 3
The United States had not been a loser in the bargaining process.
Indeed, the U.S. was one of the big winners in the coastal undersea land-
grab that the new concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone ("EEZ") cre-
ated. ' The United States, along with Australia, New Zealand, Canada,
Japan, Norway, and the USSR, gained rights to forty-four percent of the
total EEZ area for their fifteen percent of the world population.8 5 All
told, twenty-eight developed coastal states get a larger EEZ than all of
the approximate 130 odd developing countries together."8 6 Further, the
United States, along with the Soviet Union, earned numerous conces-
sions from the developing coastal states in the areas of traditional con-
cern to large naval and maritime powers."8 7
Nonetheless, the United States stood alone among the great powers
in its rejection of the new treaty. 8 For some critics, U.S. participation
in the treaty failed to fill the ideological vacuum that was ultimately filled
by the NIEO proponents.8 9 To counteract this previous U.S. failure,
President Reagan had "asserted the values of democracy and free enter-
prise and rejected efforts to impose a collectivist ideology upon the multi-
lateral negotiating process that had become evident...."I"
Congress' disregard for the UNCLOS III in its drafting of the
MHSA and MDLE is reflective of the Executive's failure to acknowledge
the positive aspects of the final document. Considerable confusion' 9 ' has
been created by the "soft law"' 92 that the UNCLOS III represents. De-
spite this confusion among policymakers, U.S. courts have a duty' 93 as
interpreters of international law to ensure that the changes brought about
182 Sahmeck Jr., Johnson Asks Joint Exploitation of Sea Resources, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1966,
at 10, col. 4.
183 Ratiner, supra note 143.
184 L. HENKIN, supra note 50, at 216-19; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 511.
185 Chimni, Law of the Sea." Winners are Losers, in 24 ECON. & POL. WEEKLY 987, 992 (1982).
186 Id.
187 L. HENKIN, supra note 50.
188 Id; See also J. SEBENIUS, NEGOTIATING THE LAW OF THE SEA (1984).
189 Lilla, Third World's Sea Pact Takes U.S. for a Ride, Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1981, at 20, col.1.
190 Who Needs the Sea Treaty, supra note 178; Burke & Brokaw, supra note 176, at 50.
191 Gamble & Frankawska, The 1982 Convention and Customary Law of the Sea.: Observations,
a Framework, and a Warning, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 491 (1984); See also Colson, The United
States; the Law of the Sea, and the Pacific, in CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION; THE UNITED
STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION (. Van Dyke ed. 1984); Oxman, The United
States and the Law of the Sea After the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 46 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROnS. 78 (1983).
192 Gamble, The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as Soft Law, 8 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 37 (1985).
193 US. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10.
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by UNCLOS III are appropriately reflected in their decisions. There
has been a change in the spirit of international law illustrated by the
UNCLOS III: "[i]n essence, the Convention cannot force a State to play
by new rules, but may be able to outlaw the old game."19 4
The old game was based on a notion of the high seas as res nuiius,
no one's property. Grotius had stated that the open ocean was an open
frontier for the use and exploitation of anyone.195 The Truman procla-
mation and the subsequent phenomenon of "creeping jurisdiction" '96 al-
tered that order.
The old frontier spirit of freedom of the high seas was replaced by a
new spirit of international cooperation and control of the high seas. 97
The UNCLOS III ushered in a new order based on the concept of the
open ocean as res communis, community property. 198 The oceans had
been divided up, placing final control either in the hands of coastal states
or under the control of the international community as a whole. 19 9 In-
dependent action of the sort permitted by the MHSA and the MDLE
harken back to freedoms allowed under the Grotian concept of the high
seas as res nuius. The Acts thus violate the new spirit embodied in the
UNCLOS III.
B. The Letter of UNCLOS III
The letter of UNCLOS III is the codification of existent customary
international law and the creation of new international norms. The doc-
ument is universal in its character, having been created by the consensus
of the large majority of the world's states. UNCLOS III directly ad-
dresses the problem of the illicit traffic in narcotics.2" The language of
the Final Document does not, however, go so far as to permit the type of
unilateral activity permitted by the MHSA and the MDLE. The political
and ideological nature of UNCLOS III appear to have branded it as a
useless source of international law for U.S. lawmakers. Nonetheless, the
letter of UNCLOS III is based on a universal consensus of international
law and it should be acknowledged as such. For this reason the letter
UNCLOS III needs to be considered when examining domestic law, such
as the Acts, that is enforced at the international level.
Ships are required to have a national origin so that safety on the
194 Gamble & Frankowska, supra note 191, at 510.
195 H. GROTIUS, supra note 151.
196 See generally M. AKEHiURST, supra note 146; Ball, supra note 150; C.J. COLUMBOS, supra
note 146; C. SANGER, supra note 146; and Ratiner, supra note 143.
197 Id
198 Id.
199 UNCLOS III, supra note 3, art. 89 (invalidity of claims of sovereignty over the high seas).
No State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty.
200 UNCLOS III, supra note 3, art. 91.
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high seas can be assured by the parent state of the vessels. 201 UNCLOS
III recognizes the classic Lotus2 '2 case which established that: "Vessels
on the high seas are subject to no authority except that of the State whose
flag they fly."2 03 Without some claim of territoriality, no States can exert
sovereign control over a vessel not of its own nationality.2 ° 4
There are certain exceptions to the Lotus rule that are expressly ad-
dressed by UNCLOS III. Pirate vessels2 5 and vessels involved in the
slave trade20 6 may be placed under the jurisdiction of any State. UN-
CLOS III creates a positive "[d]uty of all states to cooperate in the re-
pression of piracy. "207 Piracy and slave trading are universal crimes that
have been specifically condemned by the international community.20"
Furthermore, piracy has been defined in UNCLOS III to avoid vague
and overbroad interpretations.20 9
Trafficking in illicit narcotics has not been included as an exception
to the Lotus rule210 because it is not a universally condemned crime.211
201 UNCLOS Ill, supra note 3, art. 94.
202 S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept 7).
203 Id. at 70.
204 Id. at 25. See also Note, supra note 25. Much has been made of the fact that statelessness
of a vessel permits boarding by the Coast Guard. See Anderson, supra note 31. The MDLE specifi-
cally addresses the problem at 46 U.S.C. 1903, and the UNCLOS HI does provide for the boarding
of stateless vessels. The UNCLOS HI intent based on the language of the rest of the document is to
ensure shipping safety by enforcement of registration requirements, not seizure and incarceration of
seamen as permitted by the MDLE. Another question that is open for speculation is the logical leap
made by U.S. courts from a vessel's statelessness to its crew's being subject to the jurisdiction of
foreign sovereigns. That is, just because a State may stop and search a stateless vessel does not
necessarily mean that its crewmembers may also be apprehended. The literal wording and the spirit
of both the UNCLOS IH and the United Nations Charter, infra note 201, would seem to require
more than a vessel's statelessness to permit the extension of jurisdiction over foreign nationals with-
out active consent of their home States.
205 UNCLOS III, supra note 3, art. 100; and RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 522 comments c
and d.
206 Id.
207 Id
208 See I.L. BRrERLY, supra note 47.
209 UNCLOS IH, supra note 3, arts. 101 and 105.
210 See S.S. Lotus, supra note 202; Note, supra note 25.
211 International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking of June 26, 1987, 26 I.L.M.
1637 (1987). The conference called for cooperation among states to curb trafficking, but required
that any actions be consistent with agreements and not be violative of national legal frameworks.
There has been some discussion as to whether the Acts violate fourth amendment protection against
unreasonable search and seizure. See Note, High on the Seas: Drug Smuggling, the Fourth Amend-
ment, and Warrantless Searches at Sea, 93 HARV. L. REv. 725 (1980); Note, Maritime Criminal Law
- The Maritime Exception to the Fourth Amendment Requirement for a Warrant and Probable Cause,
7 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 55 (1984); Note, Burial at Sea for the Fourth Amendment?, 17 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REv. 545 (1984); Note, Treating a Vessel like a Home for Purposes of Conducting a Search,
21 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 751 (1984). There may also be room for doubt that the seizures permitted by
the Acts is not violative of the United Nations Charter. U.N. Charter, art. 2. 4. The Charter
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UNCLOS III specifically addresses the problem of illicit traffic in
drugs,21 2 but does not use the same compelling language used in the
piracy provisions. 213 The language of the Acts does not mirror that of
the UNCLOS III.
A consensus of the international community is reflected in UN-
CLOS III. Though there is some question as to the softness of its law,24
there is no doubt that the international phenomenon of UNCLOS III
exists. Despite the ideological difficulties, the phenomenon must be rec-
ognized by U.S. policymakers and judges. UNCLOS III is a potent, uni-
versal expression of law that ought to be acknowledged in congressional
acts and, more importantly, considered in judicial decisions.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States Congress and courts have acted contrary to inter-
national law as embodied in UNCLOS 111.215 Both the MHSA and the
MDLE permit actions outside the scope of both the letter and the spirit
of the UNCLOS 111.216 The state of customary and codified interna-
tional law calls for international cooperation in the face of the menace of
illicit drug trafficking. Congress needs to consider UNCLOS III when
drafting domestic legislation that might be mirrored in the international
document. Before allowing jurisdiction over foreign nationals appre-
hended aboard stateless vessels on the high seas, courts should question
whether there has been any type of cooperation between the states from
which the foreign nationals originate and the United States. The absence
provisions relevant to human rights require probable cause and reasonable notice prior to incarcera-
tion or the taking of property. See also United States ex. rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975) (U.S. agents kidnap drug kingpin from Bolivia for prosecu-
tion in U.S., unprotected by fourth amendment or by article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter since charter
applies only to states and not individuals); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974)
(foreign drug kingpin kidnapped in Uruguay by U.S. agents, interrogated and beaten in Brazil by
U.S. agents, flown to U.S. for prosecution, protected by fourth amendment but not by U.N. Charter
despite protest by Uruguay); Findlay, Abducting Terrorists Overseas for Trial in the United Stater
Issues of International and Domestic Law, 23 TFx. INT'L L. J. 1 (1988).
212 UNCLOS III, supra note 3, art. 108.
213 Id Article 108 requires some reasonable grounds for a request for cooperation among
states in the slowing of drug trafficking. Article 100 requires that states act to the fullest possible
extent to halt piracy. The Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States also
acknowledges this distinction and stresses the fact that there has been no formal international decla-
ration that drug smugglers ought to be treated in the same way as pirates. Restatement, supra note
4, § 513, comment e; § 521 Reporter's notes; and, § 522 comment d. See also Note, "Smoke on the
Water'" Coast Guard authority to Seize Foreign Vessels Beyond the Contiguous Zone, 13 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. 249 (1980).
214 See Gamble, supra note 192; Colson, supra note 191; Gamble & Frankowska, supra note
191; Oxman, supra note 191.
215 See supra notes 86-101 and accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 143-214 and accompanying text.
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of protest by the State should not be enough to indicate cooperation in
the prosecutorial effort. Cooperation requires action not omission.
Drug traffickers are not pirates or slavetraders. The United States is
not free to act unilaterally. If the War on Drugs is to succeed it will
require a cooperative effort. Much of the drug producing world has per-
mitted the actions of its drug kingpins for the sake of economic indepen-
dence and physical survival. This is why cooperation is required by
international law. The United States cannot preempt the sovereignty of
producer states or their nationals on the high seas unless some bilateral
or multilateral agreement allowing that preemption is in existence. Coast
Guard seizures hundreds of miles from U.S. waters may be based upon a
good policy decision, but the legislation permitting it is bad law in light
of UNCLOS III. If the War on Drugs is to succeed it must be done on a
legitimate cooperative basis, not on an illegitimate unilateral basis. Con-
gress and courts do not help the War on Drugs by operating outside the
law.
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